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Had Article 52 of the ICSID Convention1 been drafted 
expansively, ICSID parties would know that they face the common 
prospect of a two-staged process, arbitration followed by ad hoc 
committee review. 
Article 52 is, however, drafted restrictively, and its text creates the 
reasonable expectation of parties to ICSID cases that annulment will 
be available only for egregious injustices of a procedural nature and 
not in situations where the ad hoc committee disagrees with the 
substantive decision rendered by the tribunal.2 ICSID’s annulment 
history has mostly been faithful to the language of Article 52. But 
there have been periods when annulment has been the norm, or an 
omnipresent threat. 
ICSID’s annulment virus first appeared in the Klöckner v. 
Republic of Cameroon3 decision in 1983, and took a worse form in 
the Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia I annulment in 1985.4 
The virus then lay dormant for some 25 years, re-appearing with the 
ad hoc Committee decisions in Sempra Energy International v. 
Argentine Republic,5 Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine 
 
 1. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States art. 52, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 
1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
 2. The grounds for ICSID annulment are similar to, but more restrictive than, 
those set out in the UNCITRAL Model Law for review of arbitral awards, yet, 
courts have been more deferential than ad hoc Committees to arbitral awards. Juan 
Fernández-Armesto, Different Systems for the Annulment of Investment Awards, 
ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INV. L. J. 128, 145 (2011). 
 3. Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Rep. of Cameroon, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/81/2, Decision on Annulment (May 3, 1985), 2 ICSID REP. 95 (1994) 
[hereinafter Klöckner]. 
 4. Amco Asia Corp. v. the Rep. of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 
Decision on Annulment (May 16, 1986), 1 ICSID REP. 509 (1993) [hereinafter 
Amco I]. 
 5. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision 
on Annulment (June 29, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet? 
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1550En&caseId=C8 
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Republic,6 and Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Service Worldwide v. 
Republic of the Philippines,7 all decided in 2010.8 Two decisions 
from September 2011 (Continental Casualty Corp. v. Argentine 
Republic9 and Togo Electricité v. Republic of Togo (“GDF”)10) 
suggest that the second viral phase may have been short lived. 
Following the decisions in Klöckner and Amco I, the problems 
caused by excessive annulments were clearly perceived. Those 
decisions were heavily criticized by both academics and practitioners 
for their “hair trigger” approach to annulment.11 Following Klöckner, 
a number of decisions over a period of some 20 years adopted a 
much more cautious approach to the review of ICSID awards.12 This 
 
[hereinafter Sempra]. 
 6. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Decision on Annulment (July 30, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/ 
EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf [hereinafter Enron]. 
 7. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-Annulment-Decision.pdf [hereinafter Fraport 
I]. 
 8. Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on 
Annulment (Nov. 1, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/mitchellannulment.pdf, 
could also be seen as overly-exuberant, but there is no indication that this case, 
whose facts were singular, gave rise to a trend. 
 9. Continental Casualty Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, 
Decision on Annulment (Sept. 16, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID 
/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2291_En&
caseId=C13 [Continental Casualty Corp.]. 
 10. Togo Electricité v. Rep. of Togo, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/07, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/06/07, Decision on Annulment (Sept. 6, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank. 
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC
2272_Fr&caseId=C75 [hereinafter Togo Electricité]. 
 11. See, e.g., A.D. Redfern, ICSID – Losing its Appeal?, 3 ARB. INT’L 98, 109 
(1987) (acknowledging that the ad hoc Committee’s decision in Klöckner, which 
held that a Tribunal’s failure to deal with every question before it could lead to 
annulment, may be applied to annul many other ICSID awards); W. Michael 
Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 89 
DUKE L.J. 739, 762 (1989) [hereinafter Reisman, Breakdown of the Control 
Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration] (defining “hair trigger” as a mechanism of 
sensitivity where nullification of an award would be automatically instated if a 
defect, no matter how slight, were established); W. Michael Reisman, Repairing 
ICSID’s Control System: Some Comments on Aron Broches’ “Observations on the 
Finality of ICSID Awards,” 7 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INV. L.J. 196, 200 (1992) 
(arguing that the ad hoc Committee misinterpreted Article 52(3) when justifying 
its conclusion that it must annul an award even without a material violation). 
 12. See, e.g., Compañia de Aguas del Aconquia S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 
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led many to believe that the annulment virus had been permanently 
eradicated. For example, in 2005, the ad hoc Committee in CDC 
Group PLC v. Republic of Seychelles 13 stated: 
[T]here has been an evolution in the ICSID annulment case law and 
scholarship away from Klöckner I and Amco Asia I that has culminated, in 
our view correctly, in ad hoc Committees reviewing arbitral proceedings 
only to the extent of ensuring their fundamental fairness, eschewing any 
temptation to “second guess” their substantive result.14 
However, only five years after CDC was decided, the lessons of 
Klöckner I and Amco I appear to have been sufficiently forgotten to 
enable the second viral phase of annulment decisions in 2010. In 
Enron, Sempra and Fraport, the respective ad hoc Committees 
succumbed to the temptation to annul decisions because of a 
perception that the tribunal had got it wrong. 
Even if the second viral phase is assumed to be finished, 
experience suggests that, once the memory of this second phase has 
faded, ad hoc committees may again find themselves unable to resist 
the temptation of annulling awards that they consider to have been 
wrongly decided. Given the availability of alternative fora for the 
resolution of investment disputes,15 a further phase of excessive 
 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 65 (July 3, 2002), 6 ICSID 
REP. 340 (2004) [hereinafter Vivendi I] (“[A]nnulment under Article 52(1)(e) 
should only occur in a clear case. . . . the failure to state reasons must leave the 
decision on a particular point essentially lacking in any expressed rationale; and . . 
. that point must itself be necessary to the tribunal’s decision.”); Wena Hotels Ltd. 
v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 
53 (Feb. 5, 2002), 6 ICSID REP. 67 (2004) [hereinafter Wena Hotels.] (positing that 
the Tribunal’s reliance on “[in]appropriate criteria” in evaluating the merits of the 
case would not have justified annulment); Mar. Int’l Nominees Establishment v. 
Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Decision on Partial Annulment, ¶ 
5.07–11 (Dec. 22, 1989), 4 ICSID REP. 79 (1997) [hereinafter MINE] (determining 
that the failure of the Tribunal to deal with every question submitted to it, pursuant 
to article 48(3) of the Convention, does not necessarily require annulment). 
 13. CDC Group PLC v. Rep. of Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, 
Decision on Annulment (June 29, 2005), 11 ICSID REP. 206 (2007) [hereinafter 
CDC]. 
 14. Id. ¶ 35. 
 15. For example, investment disputes can be, and many are, settled by ad hoc 
arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. See generally UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, adopted on Apr. 28, 1976, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral 
/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1976Arbitrationrules.html. An award rendered by 
such a tribunal is subject only to review by national courts in the supervisory 
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annulments could result in irreversible damage to ICSID’s reputation 
as the world’s pre-eminent forum for the settlement of investment 
disputes. 
In this article, we consider in Section I two preliminary questions: 
(i) whether the Convention’s travaux préparatoires offer a 
justification for an expansive interpretation of Article 52; and (ii) 
whether annulments have in fact been problematically frequent 
during the peak phases of nullification. We then discuss in Section II 
how ad hoc committees have treated the three principal grounds for 
annulment, and seek to show the similarity between the two rabid 
phases of annulment.16 In Section III, we offer concluding 
observations about the way forward. 
I. TWO PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 
A. DO THE CONVENTION’S TRAVAUX OFFER ANY JUSTIFICATION 
FOR AN EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 52(1)? 
The answer to the question is: no.  
There was relatively little discussion of Article 52(1) during the 
negotiation of the ICSID Convention.17 The final text is in 
substantially the same form as that proposed in the Preliminary 
Draft.18  
The drafting history suggests that annulments were intended to be 
exceptional events19 and that the grounds for annulment in Article 
 
jurisdiction in which, or under the law of which, the award was made. See 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT’L COM. ARB. art. 34 (2006). In most cases, the 
only available grounds for review will be those set out under national law, which 
often is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration. See id. (allowing national courts to review and annul awards that are 
inconsistent with state law). 
 16. There are, in particular, similarities between the two rabid phases of 
ICSID’s annulment history in relation to the treatment of manifest excess of power 
under Article 52(1)(b). See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 52(1)(b). 
 17. Cf. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES [ICSID], 1 CONVENTION 
ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS 
OF OTHER STATES: ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE 
FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION 230–32 (1970) [hereinafter HISTORY OF 
ICSID VOL. 1] (providing an early draft of the article). 
 18. Id. 
 19. For example, the Netherlands delegate stated that annulments “should be 
confined to very rare cases because in the ordinary course of events[,] the award 
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52(1) were to be more restrictive than the grounds laid down in the 
New York Convention.20 The fact that the drafters anticipated a 
paucity of annulment proceedings is also suggested by the absence of 
any provision for a permanent body of Article 52 decision-makers21 
and the restrictive eligibility requirements for persons to sit on ad 
hoc committees.22  
(i) Manifest Excess of Powers 
The Preliminary Draft of the ICSID Convention provided that an 
award’s validity could be challenged if “the Tribunal has exceeded 
its powers.”23 This ground was amended to require that a Tribunal 
must have “manifestly” exceeded its powers.24 The justification 
given for this change was that the more restrictive wording would 
help to avoid the “risk of frustration of awards.”25  
The drafters of the Convention did not debate the meaning of the 
word “manifestly.” Aron Broches, General Counsel of the World 
Bank and principal architect of the ICSID Convention, stated that: 
 
should be treated as final.” ICSID, 2 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION: 
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE 
CONVENTION pt. 2, at 852 (1968) [hereinafter HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 2]. 
However, it also appears that the drafters considered and rejected a proposal to 
include specific language to “clearly indicate that the causes for annulment would 
be exceptional.” Id. at 854. 
 20. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards art. 5, June 7, 1959, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 50 [hereinafter New 
York Convention]; see also ICSID, 2 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION: 
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE 
CONVENTION pt. 1, at 423 (1968) [hereinafter HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 1] 
(“[I]t had been fully recognized that only limited recourse had been provided and 
that acceptance of the binding character of the award went beyond what was 
normally expected in respect of an arbitral tribunal.”). 
 21. See generally William Laurence Craig, Uses and Abuses of Appeal from 
Awards, 4 ARB. INT’L 174 (1988). 
 22. HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 2, supra note 19, at 854–55 (“Mr. Burrows 
(United Kingdom) stated that their suggestion was that a further ground of 
ineligibility for membership of the Reviewing Committee should be possession of 
the same nationality as any member of the Tribunal which rendered the award. The 
reason was that these nullity proceedings were only for very extreme cases of 
serious misconduct . . . .”). 
 23. HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 1, supra note 17, at 230. 
 24. Subsequent proposals to delete the word “manifestly” were defeated by a 
vote. See HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 2, supra note 19, at 851–52. 
 25. HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 1, supra note 20, at 423. 
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the expression “manifestly exceeded its powers” concerned the cases 
referred to earlier as ultra petita, namely, where the Tribunal would have 
gone beyond the scope of agreement of the parties or would have decided 
points which had not been submitted to it or had been improperly 
submitted to it. He added that the ad hoc Committee would limit itself to 
cases of manifest excess of those powers.26 
A particular example of “an excess of power” discussed by the 
drafters was the failure by the Tribunal to apply the law chosen by 
the parties. Broches confirmed that “failure to apply the right law 
would constitute an excess of power if the parties had instructed the 
Tribunal to apply a particular law.”27 However, the drafters 
considered and rejected a proposal to add a ground of annulment for 
“manifestly incorrect application of the law.”28  
(ii) Serious Departure from a Fundamental Rule of Procedure 
The basic formula of Article 52(1)(d) remained unchanged 
throughout the drafting history of the ICSID Convention and its 
inclusion was never challenged in principle.29 
Broches stated that the term fundamental rules of procedure 
“would comprise, for instance, the so-called principles of natural 
justice e.g., that both parties must be heard and that there must be 
adequate opportunity for rebuttal.”30 The preparatory works thus 
“make it clear that only procedural principles of special importance 
would qualify as ‘fundamental rules’” but they “do not give guidance 
as to the serious nature of a violation.”31 
 
 26. HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 2, supra note 19, at 850. 
 27. Id. at 851. 
 28. Id. at 853–54. Broches also stated, in relation to a suggestion to expand the 
scope of what is now Article 52(1)(d), that “if sub-paragraph (c) were expanded to 
cover serious errors in the application of substantive law, it would be tantamount to 
providing for an appeal, a step which had not thus far been contemplated.” 
HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 1, supra note 20, at 340. 
 29. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 888 
(2nd ed. 2001). 
 30. HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 1, supra note 20, at 480. However, the 
delegates expressly considered and rejected a proposal to “refer specifically to a 
requirement that both parties must have a fair hearing.” HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, 
PT. 2, supra note 19, at 853. 
 31. SCHREUER, supra note 29, at 970. 
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(iii) Failure to State Reasons 
In the Preliminary Draft of the ICSID Convention,32 the failure to 
state reasons for an award was included as an example of a serious 
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure. In subsequent 
drafts, it was listed as a separate ground. It appears to have been 
agreed that the requirement to give reasons was intended to include 
both factual and legal reasoning.33 
*    *    * 
During periods of excessive annulment, ad hoc committees have 
found ways to justify their unauthorized appellate review. The 
explanation for this conduct cannot be attributed to either the 
language or the drafting history of Article 52.34 Rather, ICSID’s 
annulment history during its rabid phases shows that there is no 
language that is immune to manipulation, and no textual safeguard 
against ICSID-appointed international law experts bent on finding, 
against common sense, a textual justification for what they want to 
do.  
B. HAVE ANNULMENTS DURING THE RABID PHASES  
BEEN THAT FREQUENT? 
The answer to the question is: yes.  
During the 1970s, there were four ICSID awards and there were 
no annulment proceedings.35  
During the 1980s (the first viral phase), four of the nine ICSID 
awards led to annulment proceedings, and 33% of the total awards 
rendered were annulled, a shocking frequency.36  
The 1990s was a calm period: of 18 awards, there were two 
annulment proceedings; one of these was discontinued and the other 
 
 32. See generally HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 1, supra note 17. 
 33. HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 2, supra note 19, at 851. 
 34. See generally Aron Broches, Observations on the Finality of ICSID 
Awards, 6 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INV. L. J. 321 (1991) (tracing the drafting of 
Article 52 from its origins in the International Law Commission’s Draft 
Convention on Arbitral Procedure of 1953). 
 35. See ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD: STATISTICS (ISSUE 2012-1), at 15 (2012) 
[hereinafter ICSID CASELOAD], available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=CaseLoadStatistics. 
 36. See id. 
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resulted in a rejection of the request.37  
Since 2000, there has been a proliferation of both cases brought 
before ICSID and annulment proceedings. Of 96 rendered awards 
between 2001 and 2010, 26 annulment applications were registered.38 
In 2010 alone, there were eight ad hoc Committee decisions39 and 
four of these annulled the award in whole or in part.40 Thus, from 
2001 to 2010, over one-quarter of the awards rendered by ICSID 
tribunals led to applications for annulment, and, of these requests, 
eight resulted in partial or total annulment of the award, another 
phase of shocking frequency.41 The activist trend has continued in 
2011: six annulment proceedings were registered during the first-half 
of the year.42  
 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See, e.g., Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment 
(Dec. 23, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-Annulment-Decision.pdf; 
Sociedad Anónima Eduardo Vieira v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/7; Republic 
of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/7, Decision on Annulment (Dec. 10, 2010), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&DocId=DC1851_Sp&caseId=C238 [hereinafter Sociedad Anónima 
Eduardo Vieira]; Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Annulment (July 
30, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf; Sempra, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on Annulment (June 29, 2010), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&docId=DC1550_En&caseId=C8; Helnan Int’l Hotels v. Arab Republic 
of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision on Annulment (June 14, 2010), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&DocId=DC1631_En&caseId=C64 [hereinafter Helnan Int’l Hotels]; 
Compagnie d’Exploitation du Chemin de Fer Transgabonais v. Gabonese 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/5, Decision on Annulment (May 11, 2010), 26 
ICSID REV. 153 (2011); Rumeli Telekom v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/16, Decision on Annulment (Mar. 25, 2010), http://italaw.com/ 
documents/RumeliAnnulment.pdf; Vivendi I, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision 
on Annulment (July 3, 2002), 6 ICSID REP. 340 (2004). 
 40. Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, at 111; Enron, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3, at 169; Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 229; Helnan Int’l 
Hotels, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, ¶ 73(1). 
 41. See ICSID CASELOAD, supra note 35, at 15; see also UNCTAD, LATEST 
DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 6 (2011), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//webdiaeia20113en.pdf (mentioning the four 
annulments granted by ad hoc committees in 2010). 
 42. Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Annulment 
(Feb. 14, 2012); Astaldi S.p.A. v. Republic of Hond., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/32, 
Decision on Annulment (June 15, 2011); Commerce Group Corp. v. Republic of El 
Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Decision on Annulment (Mar. 14, 2011), 
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II. MISAPPLICATION OF ANNULMENT GROUNDS 
Parties requesting annulment usually invoke three of the five 
Article 52(1) annulment grounds: 52(1)(b), manifest excess of 
power; 52(1)(d), serious departure from a fundamental rule of 
procedure; and 52(1)(e), failure to state reasons.43 In many cases, 
applicants will raise all three of these grounds in challenging a single 
provision of an award.44 
This Section considers these three grounds as applied and 
misapplied during the two rabid phases of ICSID annulment. 
A. MANIFEST ABUSE OF MANIFEST EXCESS OF POWER AS A 
GROUND FOR ANNULMENT 
Manifest excess of power is the most often-invoked and most 
controversial ground for annulment. Every publicly available 
decision includes an application for annulment on this ground.45  
 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&DocId=DC1971_En&caseId=C461; Malicorp Ltd. v. Arab Republic 
of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/18, Decision on Annulment (Feb. 7, 2011), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&DocId=DC1911_En&caseId=C461; Nations Energy, Inc. v. Republic 
of Pan., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/19 (Nov. 24, 2010); AES Summit Generation 
Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Decision on Annulment 
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= 
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&DocId=DC1730_En&caseId=C114. 
 43. Christoph Schreuer, From ICSID Annulment to Appeal – Half Way Down 
the Slippery Slope, 10 L. & PRAC. OF INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 211, 214 (2011) 
[hereinafter Schreuer, From ICSID Annulment to Appeal]. 
 44. Duke Energy Int’l Peru Inv. No. 1 Ltd. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/28, ¶ 91 (Mar. 1, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/Dukev 
PeruFinal_1Mar2011_Eng.pdf [hereinafter Duke Energy] (noting that the “practice 
[of simultaneously invoking these three grounds] is entirely permissible within the 
framework of Article 52(1), which permits a party to request annulment ‘on one or 
more of the following grounds.’”). 
 45. See LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION, Annex 10, tbl. 
III(B) (2nd ed. 2011); see also Sociedad Anónima Eduardo Vieira, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/04/7, ¶ 57 (listing manifest excess of power as the first of three 
arguments for annulment); Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on 
Annulment, ¶ 33 (Dec. 23, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-
Annulment-Decision.pdf (noting that manifest excess of power was one of the 
annulment grounds raised by the applicant); Duke Energy, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/28, ¶ 124 (explaining that Peru argued that the Tribunal manifestly 
exceeded its power); Togo Electricité, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/07, ¶ 9 (including 
manifest excess of power as one of two grounds for annulment raised by Togo); 
  
2012] ABUSIVE ICSID ANNULMENTS 737 
The ICSID Convention departs from the New York Convention 
and UNCITRAL Model Law, which allow a court to refuse 
recognition or enforcement of an award when it deals with a 
difference falling outside the terms of the submission to arbitration or 
when it contains decisions on matters that exceed the scope of the 
arbitration application.46 This ground is effectively identical to 
Article 52(1)(b)’s excess of powers, except that it does not require 
that the excess be “manifest.” The mis-adventures of ad hoc 
committees arise from their mis-application of the word “manifest.”  
The problem is not what ad hoc committees recite that they should 
do in applying the term “manifest.” All ad hoc committees are 
mindful to emphasize that the excess must be “manifest.” Some have 
applied the professed standard faithfully; others have just recited 
what they should do and then ignored the common sense meaning of 
“manifest.” 
The interpretation of “manifest” is subject to some legitimate 
debate only insofar as there is a question whether the word 
“manifest” relates to the ease by which the excess is perceived and/or 
the gravity of the excess. In Wena Hotels, the ad hoc Committee 
observed that “the excess of power must be self-evident rather than 
the product of elaborate interpretations one way or the other,” 
concluding that “[w]hen the latter happens the excess of power is no 
longer manifest.”47 Other committees have perceived the requirement 
 
Continental Casualty Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on Annulment, 
¶ 78 (Sept. 16, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request 
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2291En&caseId=C13 (noting 
Argentina’s request for annulment based on manifest excess of powers and failure 
to state reasons). 
 46. New York Convention, supra note 20, art. V(1)(c) (“Recognition and 
enforcement of the award may be refused . . . [if] [t]he award deals with a 
difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to 
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission 
to arbitration . . . .”); UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT’L COM. ARB., supra note 
15, art. 34(2)(iii) (“An Arbitral award may be set aside by the court . . . only if . . . 
the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms 
of the submission to arbitration. or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope 
of the submission to arbitration . . . .”). 
 47. Wena Hotels., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 25 
(Feb. 5, 2002), 6 ICSID REP. 67 (2004); see also Repsol YPF Ecuador v. Empresa 
Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/10, Decision on 
Annulment, ¶ 36 (Jan. 8, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet? 
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC617En&caseId=C203 
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of “manifest excess” to relate to the extent and seriousness of the 
excess rather than its clarity.48 The ad hoc Committee in Soufraki 
aptly reconciled these views: 
[T]he Committee believes that a strict opposition between two different 
meanings of “manifest” – either “obvious” or “serious” – is an 
unnecessary debate. It seems to this Committee that a manifest excess of 
power implies that the excess of power should at once be textually 
obvious and substantively serious.49 
Ad hoc committees are therefore aware that decisions of Tribunals 
should be annulled only where a serious error has been committed 
and where such error is obvious. However, history shows that certain 
ad hoc committees have been unable to resist the temptation of re-
trying cases. The path to error was paved by the Amco I ad hoc 
Committee.  
(i) Amco I 
The Amco I ad hoc Committee began by emphasizing that it did 
not intend to analyze whether the Tribunal erred in evaluating 
pertinent law or facts:  
Such scrutiny is properly the task of a court of appeals, which the ad hoc 
committee is not. The ad hoc Committee will limit itself to determining 
whether the Tribunal did in fact apply the law it was bound to apply to the 
dispute. Failure to apply such law, as distinguished from mere 
misconstruction of that law, would constitute a manifest excess of powers 
on the part of the Tribunal.50 
However, when the ad hoc Committee came to consider the 
 
(finding that the excess must be “‘obvious by itself’” and ascertainable “simply by 
reading the Award, that is even prior to a detailed examination of its contents. . . 
.”); CDC, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 41 (June 29, 
2005), 11 ICSID REP. 206 (2007) (“[T]he excess must be plain on its face for 
annulment to be an available remedy. Any excess apparent in a Tribunal’s conduct, 
if susceptible of argument ‘one way or the other,’ is not manifest.”). 
 48. See Vivendi I, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 115 
(July 3, 2002), 6 ICSID REP. 340 (2004) (declaring the excess of power “manifest” 
because of “the clear and serious implications of [the Tribunal’s] decision.”). 
 49. Soufraki v. U.A.E., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Decision on Annulment, 
¶40 (June 5, 2007), http://italaw.com/documents/SoufrakiAnnulment.pdf. 
 50. Amco I, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 23 (May 
16, 1986), 1 ICSID REP. 509 (1993). 
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substantive challenges made by Indonesia, it proceeded to do 
precisely what it had foresworn. It scrutinized the manner in which 
the Tribunal had assessed factual evidence and arrived at 
conclusions.  
The Tribunal had held that Amco had invested approximately $2.5 
million in Indonesia in accordance with Indonesia’s investment 
law.51 The ad hoc Committee performed a detailed analysis of how 
the Tribunal had calculated this figure and determined that it was 
incorrect.52  
The ad hoc Committee stated: 
[I]t was firmly established, in the view of the ad hoc Committee, firstly 
that according to relevant provisions of Indonesian law, only investments 
recognized and definitely registered as such by the competent Indonesian 
authority (Bank Indonesia) are investments within the meaning of the 
Foreign Investment Law (Law No.1/1967). . . .  
It was also clearly established at the Vienna hearings that PT Amco failed 
to obtain definitive registration with Bank Indonesia of all the amounts 
claimed to have been invested by it in the hotel project.53 
The Committee then concluded that the Tribunal had failed “to 
seize the critical importance of PT Amco’s duty to register its 
claimed inward investment” and that “[t]he evidence before the 
Tribunal showed that as late as 1977, Amco’s investment of foreign 
capital duly and definitely registered with Bank Indonesia in 
accordance with the Foreign Investment Law, amounted to only US$ 
983,992.”54  
Absent from the ad hoc Committee’s observations was any finding 
that the Tribunal had failed to apply, or not sought to apply, 
Indonesian law. It was undeniable that the Tribunal had applied 
Indonesian law, and had quoted Article 1 of the Foreign Investment 
Law in its award.55 The ad hoc Committee nonetheless ruled that, in 
 
 51. See id. ¶ 4. 
 52. Id. ¶¶ 90–98. 
 53. Id. ¶¶ 93–94. 
 54. Id. ¶¶ 95–96. 
 55. Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 96 (Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID REP. 413 (1993) 
[hereinafter Amco I Award]. 
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view of the Tribunal’s failure to “to seize the critical importance of 
PT Amco’s duty to register its claimed inward investment,” the 
Tribunal had “clearly failed to apply the relevant provisions of 
Indonesian law” and thus had “manifestly exceeded its powers.”56  
The ad hoc Committee’s conclusion was thus that the Tribunal 
had, in trying to apply Indonesian law, failed to understand it 
correctly, or at least not in the manner that the ad hoc Committee 
considered correct. It is not obvious that a failure correctly to apply 
individual provisions of the applicable law amounts to an “excess of 
powers” at all,57 but even assuming that this was somehow an excess 
of powers, the ad hoc Committee made no attempt to explain, and 
surely could not have explained, why any such excess of powers 
should be considered “manifest.”58 
No subsequent ad hoc committee would have the imprudence to 
cite the Amco I ad hoc Committee as a model for the application of 
 
 56. Amco I, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, ¶¶ 95–96. The ad hoc Committee also 
criticized the fact that the Tribunal had apparently included a loan in its 
calculations and concluded that this was evidence of a failure “to apply Article 2 of 
the Foreign Investment Law.” Id. ¶ 97. A review of the Tribunal’s award shows 
that it had in fact cited Article 2 of the Foreign Investment Law in two paragraphs 
of the decision. See Amco I Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, ¶¶ 228, 234. As 
Schreuer puts it, “To speak of a non-application that is distinguishable from an 
erroneous application in this context is not meaningful. The ad hoc Committee 
simply came to a different interpretation and described what it perceived as an 
erroneous application as a non-application.” SCHREUER, supra note 29, at 950. 
 57. See SCHREUER, supra note 29, at 964 (distinguishing between failing to 
apply the law and an erroneous application of law, the former being an excess of 
power, while the latter is not, and noting that the question of whether failure to 
apply certain rules of international law amounts to excess of power is not yet 
resolved). 
 58. Another transgression by the ad hoc Committee in Amco I has received no 
attention, though it was even less justifiable than its conclusion that the Tribunal 
had manifestly exceeded its power by not applying Indonesian law correctly. The 
Amco I Tribunal held that the cancellation of the investor’s investment license was 
unlawful due to due process violations regardless of the calculation of the amount 
invested by Amco. The Tribunal took pains to state explicitly that its due process 
holding was alternative to, and independent of, its holding on the amount invested. 
See Amco I Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, ¶ 201. Faced with this seemingly 
insuperable obstacle to resting annulment solely on its conclusion about the 
amount invested, the ad hoc Committee chose to read the Tribunal’s award as not 
really meaning what it said about the due process ground being an alternative and 
an independent basis for finding that Indonesia had acted wrongfully. See Amco I, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, ¶¶ 81–83. It is difficult to see in this anything other 
than an animus to annul. 
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Article 52(1)(b). Yet, Amco I’s unjustifiable application of Article 
52(1)(b) was effectively resurrected 25 years later by the ad hoc 
Committees in Sempra and Enron.59  
(ii) Sempra 
In Sempra, the Tribunal had given in-depth consideration to 
Argentina’s contentions that its actions were justified by Article XI 
of the US-Argentina BIT60 (concerning measures necessary to deal 
with emergencies) and/or the customary international law defense of 
necessity (as set out in Article 25 of the International Law 
Commission Articles on State Responsibility61). The Tribunal 
analyzed the BIT, noting that “the Treaty itself did not deal with the 
legal elements necessary for the legitimate invocation of a state of 
necessity”62 and stating that “the Treaty provision is inseparable from 
the customary law standard insofar as the definition of necessity and 
the conditions for its operation are concerned.”63  
The Tribunal then spent ten paragraphs discussing expert evidence 
on whether Article XI of the BIT was self-judging, before 
concluding: 
In the light of this discussion, the Tribunal concludes that Article XI is not 
self-judging and that judicial review is not limited in its respect to an 
examination of whether its invocation, or the measures adopted, were 
 
 59. Also noteworthy from the new generation of annulment decisions are 
Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Fed’n of Malay., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, 
Decision on Annulment (Apr. 16, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1030_En&
caseId=C247, and Helnan Int’l Hotels, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision on 
Annulment (June 14, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request 
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&DocId=DC1631_En&caseId=C64. In both 
of these decisions, the ad hoc Committees disagreed with the tribunals’ holding on 
jurisdiction and adopted an arguably expansive view of Article 52(1)(b) to annul or 
partially annul the awards. See Antonio Crivellaro, Annulment of ICSID Awards: 
Back to the “First Generation”?, in LIBER AMICORUM EN L’HONNEUR DE SERGE 
LAZAREFF 160–64 (Laurent Levy & Yves Derains eds., 2011). 
 60. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 (1992). 
 61. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, 2001 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, 80, art. 25. The International 
Law Commission is commonly referred to as the “ILC.” 
 62. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 
378 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet. 
 63. Id. ¶ 376. 
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taken in good faith. The judicial control must be a substantive one, and 
concerned with whether the requirements under customary law or the 
Treaty have been met and can thereby preclude wrongfulness. Since the 
Tribunal has found above that the crisis invoked does not meet the 
customary law requirements of Article 25 of the Articles on State 
Responsibility, it concludes that necessity or emergency is not conducive 
in this case to the preclusion of wrongfulness, and that there is no need to 
undertake a further judicial review under Article XI given that this Article 
does not set out conditions different from customary law in such regard.64 
The ad hoc Committee noted that “[a]s a general rule, a treaty will 
take precedence over customary international law”65 and explained 
why it considered there to be differences between Article XI and the 
customary international law standard (and thus why it considered the 
Tribunal to be wrong when it equated the Treaty standard with 
customary international law). The Committee then seized upon the 
above highlighted passage as evidence that: 
The Tribunal has held, in effect, that the substantive criteria of Article XI 
simply cannot find application where rules of customary international law 
– as enunciated in the ILC Articles – do not lead to exoneration in case of 
wrongfulness, and that Article 25 “trumps” Article XI in providing the 
mandatory legal norm to be applied. Thus, the Tribunal adopted Article 
25 of the ILC Articles as the primary law to be applied, rather than Article 
XI of the BIT, and in so doing made a fundamental error in identifying 
and applying the applicable law.66 
Despite the Tribunal having analyzed both Article XI and 
customary international law in a sub-section of the Award 
comprising 28 paragraphs and entitled “[t]he plea of necessity under 
Article XI of the Treaty,” the Tribunal’s “error”—in holding that the 
legal obligations under Article XI and customary international law 
were identical—was characterized by the ad hoc Committee as a 
failure to apply the applicable law rather than an error in the 
application of such law.67 
 
 64. Id. ¶ 388 (emphasis added). 
 65. Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 176 (June 
29, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH& 
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1550_En&caseId=C8. 
 66. Id. ¶ 208. 
 67. Id. Although it appears that the Sempra ad hoc Committee would have 
been prepared to do away with the distinction entirely in appropriate 
circumstances, “[a]s a general proposition, this Committee would not wish totally 
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The ad hoc Committee then moved on to the question of whether 
the Tribunal’s error was “manifest.” The ad hoc Committee simply 
asserted that its conclusion regarding the Tribunal’s supposed failure 
to apply the BIT was “obvious from a simple reading of the reasons 
of the Tribunal.”68 
Thus, the Sempra ad hoc Committee effectively: (i) disagreed with 
the Tribunal that the legal effect of Article XI of the BIT was the 
same as the test of necessity under customary international law; (ii) 
characterized that disagreement as a failure by the Tribunal to apply 
the BIT rather than an incorrect application of the BIT; and (iii) 
characterized that same error (or, rather, disagreement between the 
ad hoc Committee and the Tribunal) as a manifest excess of powers 
by the Tribunal.69 In short, the Sempra Committee’s approach was 
identical to that of the Amco I Committee: paying no more than lip 
service to the requirement that an excess of power be manifest. 
(iii) Enron 
In Enron, the ad hoc Committee went even further in eroding the 
distinction between failure to apply the applicable law (which 
amounts to an excess of power) and improper application of such law 
(which does not).70  
The issue again was the Tribunal’s treatment of the necessity 
defense.71 In Enron, the ad hoc Committee agreed with the Tribunal 
that Article 25 of the ILC Articles states the relevant test for the 
defense of necessity under customary international law, i.e., that it 
can be successfully invoked only if the act in question is “the only 
way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave 
 
to rule out the possibility that a manifest error of law may, in an exceptional 
situation, be of such egregious nature as to amount to a manifest excess of 
powers.” Id. ¶ 164. 
 68. Id. ¶ 218. 
 69. See id. ¶¶ 218–19, 229 (finding a manifest excess of power and annulling 
the Award based on the Tribunal’s failure to apply BIT Article XI as the 
Committee deemed appropriate). 
 70. See Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 219 
(July 30, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf. 
 71. Interestingly, the Enron Committee did not find that the Tribunal had 
committed any annullable error by equating Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT 
with the customary international law standard of necessity in Article 25 of the ILC 
Articles. Id. ¶ 403. 
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and imminent peril.”72  
However, the ad hoc Committee stated that the Tribunal had 
unquestioningly accepted the evidence of the Claimant’s expert 
(Professor Sebastián Edwards) that Argentina had not satisfied the 
“only way” requirement: 
The Committee considers it sufficiently implicit that the Tribunal’s 
reasoning was that the Claimants (via the Edwards Report) had identified 
alternative ways in which Argentina could have sought to address the 
economic crisis, that the Tribunal was not satisfied that none of these 
alternatives would have been available to Argentina, and that the Tribunal 
was therefore not satisfied that the “only way” requirement in Article 
25(1)(a) of the ILC Articles was satisfied . . . . 
[A] reading of the cursory reasoning of paragraphs 300 and 308-309 of 
the Award clearly suggests that the Tribunal accepted the expert evidence 
of Professor Edwards over the conflicting expert evidence of Professor 
Nouriel Roubini, to the effect that Argentina had other options available 
to it for dealing with the economic crisis. From this, without any further 
analysis, the Tribunal immediately concluded, that the measures adopted 
by Argentina were not the “only way.”73  
The ad hoc “Committee [found] that this reasoning of the Tribunal 
does not address a number of issues that are essential to the question 
of whether the ‘only way’ requirement was met”74 and therefore 
concluded that the Tribunal: 
did not in fact apply Article 25(1)(a) of the ILC Articles (or more 
precisely, customary international law as reflected in that provision), but 
instead applied an expert opinion on an economic issue. In all the 
circumstances the Committee finds that this amounts to a failure to apply 
the applicable law, as ground of annulment under Article 52(1)(b) of the 
ICSID Convention.75 
As Professor Schreuer has said: 
This reasoning of the ad hoc Committee is truly baffling. The Tribunal 
had correctly identified the governing law. It had also correctly identified 
the relevant rule and had applied it. But the ad hoc Committee found an 
 
 72. Id. ¶ 349 (emphasis added). 
 73. Id. ¶¶ 367, 376. 
 74. Id. ¶ 368. 
 75. Id. ¶ 377. 
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excess of powers because it disagreed with the way the Tribunal had 
interpreted that rule. More specifically, the ad hoc Committee found that 
the “process of reasoning” applied by the Tribunal was defective and that 
this constituted an excess of powers.76 
Although the introductory section of the Enron decision contains 
the disclaimer that “the ad hoc committee will annul the decision 
only where the tribunal has manifestly exceeded its power,”77 the 41 
paragraphs of the Decision culminating in annulment of the 
Tribunal’s findings with respect to the necessity defense contain not 
a single reference to the requirement that the Tribunal’s excess of 
power be “manifest.”78 
In each of Amco I, Sempra and Enron, despite protestations to the 
contrary, the ad hoc Committees effectively ignored the requirement 
that an excess of power must be “manifest” and exercised an 
appellate jurisdiction based on perceived errors of law or reasoning. 
The recent decisions in GDF79 and Continental Casualty80 suggest 
a recognition that the Sempra and Enron Committees went too far 
towards allowing annulment for “error of law.” The ad hoc 
Committee in Continental Casualty81 stated: 
The Committee considers that erroneous application of principles of treaty 
interpretation is also in itself an error of law, rather than a manifest excess 
of powers, at least where the error relates to the substantive issue before 
the Tribunal for decision, rather than to an issue of the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction. 
In the Committee’s view, it will amount to a non-application of the 
applicable law for a tribunal to apply, for instance, the law of State X to 
 
 76. Schreuer, From ICSID Annulment to Appeal, supra note 43, at 220. 
 77. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 69. 
 78. See id. ¶¶ 355–95. 
 79. Togo Electricité, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/07, Decision on Annulment 
(Sept. 6, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Cases 
RH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2272_Fr&caseId=C75. 
 80. Continental Casualty Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on 
Annulment (Sept. 16, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet? 
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2291_En&caseId=C13. 
 81. The ad hoc Committees in both Enron and Continental Casualty were 
presided over by Dr. Gavan Griffith QC. Enron; Continental Casualty Corp. It is 
notable that both ad hoc Committees retained the services of Dr. Christopher 
Staker (in each case with the consent of the parties) to act as expert assistant to the 
ad hoc Committee. Id. 
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determine a dispute when the applicable law is in fact the law of State Y 
or public international law. However, if the applicable law is the law of 
State X, and if the tribunal in fact applies the law of State X, it is not the 
role of an annulment committee to determine for itself whether the 
tribunal correctly identified all of the provisions of the law of State X that 
were relevant to the case before it, or whether the tribunal gave adequate 
consideration to each of those specific provisions and to the relationship 
between them, since this would be to venture into an enquiry into whether 
the tribunal applied the law correctly. Questions as to the relevance of 
particular provisions of the applicable law, and of their legal effect and 
interaction with other provisions of the applicable law, go to the 
substantive legal merits of the case and are within the power of a tribunal 
to decide. A tribunal’s decision on such questions cannot amount to a 
manifest excess of power.82 
Continental Casualty was another case where the validity of 
Argentina’s “necessity” defense under Article XI of the US-
Argentina BIT was at issue. In this case, the Tribunal had found the 
majority of Argentina’s actions to be justified by Article XI and had 
thus found no breaches of the BIT.83 The ad hoc Committee analyzed 
Continental’s pleaded grounds for annulment in relation to Article XI 
at some length, but concluded that “[e]ven if it could be established 
by Continental that the Tribunal reached an erroneous interpretation 
of Article XI of the BIT . . ., that would amount only to an error of 
law, which is not a ground of annulment.”84 
B. MISAPPLICATION OF SERIOUS DEPARTURE FROM A 
FUNDAMENTAL RULE OF PROCEDURE AS A GROUND FOR 
ANNULMENT 
This ground of annulment has been much less abused than 
“manifest excess of powers.” Although it is almost invariably 
invoked by applicants, it has very rarely been accepted by ad hoc 
committees.85 That said, certain worrying signs have emerged from 
 
 82. Continental Casualty Corp. ¶¶ 90–91. But see id. ¶ 142 (declining 
expressly to decide whether “a manifest error of law may, in an exceptional 
situation, be of such egregious nature as to amount to a manifest excess of 
power”). 
 83. But cf. id. ¶¶ 63, 67 (noting that the Tribunal found a measure entered into 
in December 2004 (Decree 1735/04) was not justified by Article XI and thus 
breached the fair and equitable treatment standard). 
 84. Id. ¶ 133. 
 85. Article 52(1)(d) has been successfully invoked twice. See Amco Asia Corp. 
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recent case law. 
The drafters of the ICSID Convention raised the bar high. First, 
the rule in question must be so essential that it can be qualified as a 
fundamental rule of procedure.86 Second, the tribunal must have 
committed such a grave violation of a procedural rule that it 
constitutes a serious departure from that rule.87  
The question of what amounts to a “fundamental rule of 
procedure” has been addressed by several ad hoc committees.88 The 
accepted standard equates to what can be termed rules of “due 
process” or “natural justice” in the domestic law setting. Article 18 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which provides that “the parties 
shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given full 
opportunity of presenting his case,” has been cited as an example of 
such a rule.89  
In Wena Hotels, the ad hoc Committee stated: 
[Article 52(1)(d)] refers to a set of minimal standards of procedure to be 
respected as a matter of international law. It is fundamental, as a matter of 
procedure, that each party is given the right to be heard before an 
independent and impartial tribunal. This includes the right to state its 
claim or its defense and to produce all arguments and evidence in support 
of it. This fundamental right has to be ensured at an equal level, in a way 
that allows each party to respond adequately to the arguments and 
 
v. Rep. of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on Annulment (Dec. 3, 
1992), 9 ICSID REP. 9, 55–57 (2006) [hereinafter Amco II] (annulling the Second 
Tribunal’s Decision on Rectification on the basis that it had been rendered on the 
request of one party without giving the other party the opportunity to file its 
observation); Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 
218, 244–47 (Dec. 23, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-Annulment-
Decision.pdf (annulling the award for a serious departure from the fundamental 
rule of procedure entitling the parties to be heard). 
 86. See MINE, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Decision on Partial Annulment, ¶ 
4.06 (Dec. 22, 1989), 4 ICSID REP. 79 (1997) (noting that the alleged erroneous 
action must also be a serious departure from the fundamental rules of procedure). 
 87.  Id. Ad hoc Committees have been mindful to remind the parties that both 
of these requirements have to be met. See, e.g., CDC, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, 
Decision on Annulment, ¶ 48 (June 29, 2005), 11 ICSID REP. 206 (2007); Wena 
Hotels., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 56 (Feb. 5, 2002), 
6 ICSID REP. 67 (2004); MINE, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, ¶ 4.06. 
 88. See, e.g., MINE, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, ¶ 5.06 (discussing the 
interpretation to be afforded the term “fundamental” and listing equality of parties 
and the opportunity to present a case as examples of fundamental rules). 
 89. Id. 
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evidence presented by the other.90 
The Wena Hotels ad hoc Committee also addressed the question of 
what amounts to a “serious departure” by endorsing the formula in 
MINE that a departure is serious where it is “substantial and [is] such 
as to deprive a party of the benefit or protection which the rule was 
intended to provide.”91 
However, two recent decisions show that there remains a danger 
of this ground of annulment being interpreted more broadly. 
(i) Enron  
In Enron, the ad hoc Committee raised sua sponte the possibility 
that the Tribunal had violated a supposed fundamental rule of “party 
autonomy.” The Parties had agreed that “no further evidence would 
be submitted after conclusion of the written pleadings except in 
‘extraordinary circumstances.’”92 Subsequently, the claimants 
submitted and the Tribunal accepted evidence without adverting to 
any extraordinary circumstances.93 
The ad hoc Committee accepted that a breach of the parties’ 
agreement on procedure would amount to a breach of the principle of 
“party autonomy” and stated that it had no doubt that “the principle 
of party autonomy is a fundamental rule of procedure.”94 
As Schreuer has noted, there is a danger to elevating the concept 
of “party autonomy” to the status of a fundamental rule of procedure:  
Any detail from a party agreement on procedure, no matter how trivial, 
could be seen as an expression of the fundamental rule of party autonomy. 
In a wider sense, the ICSID Arbitration Rules operate by agreement of the 
 
 90. Wena Hotels., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, ¶ 57; see also Duke Energy, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/28, ¶ 168 (Mar. 1, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents 
/DukevPeruFinal_1Mar2011_Eng.pdf, 
http://italaw.com/documents/DukevPeruFinal_1Mar2011_Eng.pdf (affirming the 
definition of a fundamental rule of procedure as set forth by Wena Hotels); Fraport 
I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 180–86 (Dec. 23, 
2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-Annulment-Decision.pdf (following 
the approach taken in Wena Hotels and Duke Energy). 
 91. MINE, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, ¶ 5.05. 
 92. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 194 (July 30, 
2010), http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. ¶ 195. 
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parties and could hence be imported into this ground for annulment under 
the label of party autonomy. In fact, almost any procedural rule can 
somehow be traced back to one or another broader principle that may be 
described as fundamental. The inevitable consequence would be that any 
rule of procedure becomes fundamental.95  
Professor Schreuer’s concern is valid. While some departures from 
the parties’ agreement on procedure may amount to violations of due 
process, others will not. Widely accepted concepts such as “the right 
to be heard”96 or “principe de la contradiction”97 are sufficient to deal 
with any genuine case of prejudice caused by a breach of the parties’ 
agreement on procedure. 
Ultimately, the Enron Committee chose not to annul on the basis 
of Article 52(1)(d). It found that any departure from the fundamental 
rule of “party autonomy” which may have occurred was not serious 
and did not justify annulment of the award.98 
(ii) Fraport 
Decided in December 2010, Fraport is the only ad hoc Committee 
decision to annul an award in its entirety on the basis of Article 
52(1)(d).99 Following the annulment, the claimant initiated another 
 
 95. Schreuer, From ICSID Annulment to Appeal, supra note 43, at 221. 
 96. See Helnan Int’l Hotels, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision on 
Annulment, ¶ 38 (June 14, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Front 
Servlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&DocId=DC1631_En&caseI
d=C64 (“The right to be heard does not require a tribunal to consider seriatim and 
evaluate expressly in its award every argument raised by each party.”). 
 97. See, e.g., EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, 
GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 947–48 (1999) (noting 
the importance of due process at the international and state levels of arbitration, 
and the inclusion of la principe de la contradiction in general due process). 
 98. See Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 197 
(July 30, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf (“The 
Committee is not satisfied that any departure from the principle of party autonomy 
was serious, or that Argentina has been deprived of the benefit that that principle 
was intended to provide.”). 
 99. See Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 
180–86 (Dec. 23, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-Annulment-
Decision.pdf (emphasizing that “the object and purpose of the power to annul an 
award for ‘a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure’ is to control 
the integrity of the arbitral procedure” and stating that the concept of a 
fundamental rule of procedure was “restricted to the principles of natural justice.”). 
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arbitration against the respondent.100 As Fraport remains pending at 
the time of this paper (and as the author’s law firm represents the 
Philippines), only limited comments can be made.  
At issue in Fraport was the Philippines’ Anti Dummy Law 
(“ADL”) which required public utilities in the Philippines to have at 
least 60% Philippine equity ownership (Section 1)101 and which 
prohibited intervention by non-Philippine entities in the 
administration, management, operation and control of Philippine 
public utilities (Section 2A).102 
The Tribunal found that Fraport did not have more than 60% 
ownership of the concessionaire (PIATCO) and thus had not 
breached Section 1, but that it had entered into secret shareholders’ 
agreements to control PIATCO in violation of Section 2A of the 
ADL.103  
The Tribunal considered and rejected an argument that the 
Philippines had informally accepted the investment and thus waived 
the right to rely on such breach.104 In so holding, the Tribunal 
analyzed a Resolution of the Philippines Public Prosecutor not to 
proceed with a prosecution of certain Fraport employees for breach 
of Section 1 of the ADL together with certain related documents (the 
“Prosecutor’s Resolution”), which had been submitted after the 
proceedings had been closed.105 The Tribunal concluded that the 
Prosecutor had no access to the secret shareholders’ agreements.106 
In its application for annulment, Fraport alleged that the Tribunal 
had breached its right to be heard by “admitting evidence [the 
Prosecutor’s Resolution] and substantively relying upon it after the 
 
 100. See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Rep. of the Phil., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/11/12 (resubmitted Apr. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Fraport II]. 
 101. See CONST. (1987), art. XII (Phil.) (requiring at least 60% Philippine 
ownership before a public utility company may be certified). 
 102. An Act to Punish Acts of Evasion of the Laws on the Nationalization of 
Certain Rights, Franchises, or Privileges, Comm. Act. No. 108, § 2-A (1936) 
(Phil.). 
 103. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Rep. of the Phil., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶¶ 319–27, 401 (Aug. 16, 2008). 
 104. Id. ¶¶ 387, 401. 
 105. See id. ¶¶ 368, 382 (stating that the primary purpose of the Tribunal’s 
analysis of the Prosecutor’s Resolution and related documents was to assess 
whether the Prosecutor had been aware of the secret shareholders’ agreements). 
 106. Id. ¶ 382. 
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close of proceedings without giving Fraport an opportunity to 
address the new material.”107 
In its decision, the ad hoc Committee determined that the 
Prosecutor’s Resolution was relevant to the interpretation of the 
ADL and, in particular, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the ADL could 
be breached by evidence of managerial control over PIATCO.108 The 
Committee concluded that the Prosecutor’s Resolution had “singular 
significance” to the outcome of the case.109 From the face of the 
decision, it appears that this line of reasoning was developed by the 
Tribunal sua sponte rather than following submissions by Fraport 
(which had focused on the “waiver” issue referred to above).110 
After endowing the Prosecutor’s Resolution with “singular 
significance,”111 the ad hoc Committee concluded that the Tribunal 
should have re-opened the proceedings to allow further submissions 
on the proper construction of the ADL in light of the Prosecutor’s 
Resolution112 and that its failure to do so constituted a serious 
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure, which justified 
annulment of the award.113 
The Philippines set out its concerns with regard to the decision of 
the ad hoc Committee in a letter dated June 2011 to members of 
ICSID’s Administrative Council: 
The Committee concluded that the Prosecutor’s Resolution was a critical 
legal authority because it showed how Philippine authorities applied the 
Anti Dummy Law – a line of reasoning that neither of the parties had 
proffered. Without the benefit of hearing from the parties, the Committee 
conducted its own analysis of the Prosecutor’s Resolution as evidence of 
the application of the Anti Dummy Law. It concluded that the Tribunal’s 
 
 107. Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 129 
(Dec. 23, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-Annulment-Decision.pdf. 
 108. See id. ¶ 211 (considering whether Section 2A could be breached by “an 
actual demonstration of managerial control” such that “the quantum of equity in 
the company is irrelevant”). 
 109. Id. ¶ 243. 
 110. Id. ¶ 133. Fraport’s submissions focused on the “waiver” issue referred to 
above and also included the subsidiary submission that “the Tribunal should have 
afforded Fraport an opportunity to be heard about the legal question of whether a 
finding by the Philippine Prosecutor bound the Tribunal.” Id. 
 111. Id. ¶ 243. 
 112. Id. ¶¶ 230–31. 
 113. Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, ¶¶ 232, 245. 
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application of the Anti Dummy Law in the Award was not in accord with 
the analytic framework described in the Prosecutor’s Resolution. 
Accordingly, in the Committee’s view, the Tribunal’s ruling against 
Fraport in the Award was based upon an understanding of Philippine law 
that had been rejected by the Philippine authorities. 
This conclusion was wrong. Analytically, the Award was fully consistent 
with the description of the Anti Dummy Law set out in the Prosecutor’s 
Resolution, which addressed a violation of Section 1 of the Anti Dummy 
Law and not, as the Committee mistakenly concluded, a violation of 
Section 2A. Moreover, without question, the Tribunal applied 
international and Philippine law to reach its conclusion. Under the guise 
of a serious departure from fundamental procedure, the ad hoc Committee 
effectively applied an appellate standard to set aside what it implicitly 
concluded was based on an incomplete and mistaken view of Philippine 
law. Thus the Committee concluded there was a basis to annul where 
none existed. 
Moreover, by not seeking submissions from the parties on this question, 
which the Committee considered to be the most troubling issue before it, 
the Committee denied due process and caused a serious and costly 
miscarriage of justice.114 
C. FAILURE OF COMMON SENSE IN APPLICATION OF FAILURE TO 
STATE REASONS AS A GROUND FOR ANNULMENT 
Parties have regularly invoked failure to state reasons when 
seeking to annul ICSID awards. Ad hoc committees have rarely 
annulled on this basis.  
The duty to state reasons refers to a minimum requirement. The ad 
hoc Committee in Vivendi I stated that “it is well accepted both in the 
cases and the literature that Article 52(1)(e) concerns a failure to 
state any reasons with respect to all or part of an award, not the 
failure to state correct or convincing reasons. It bears reiterating that 
an ad hoc committee is not a court of appeal. Provided that the 
reasons given by a tribunal can be followed and relate to the issues 
that were before the tribunal, their correctness is beside the point in 
terms of Article 52(1)(e).”115 The ad hoc Committee in MTD v. Chile 
 
 114. Letter from the Office of the Solicitor General of the Rep. of the Phil. to 
Members of Admin. Council (June 27, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from the Office of 
the Solicitor General]. 
 115. Vivendi I, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 64 (July 
3, 2002), 6 ICSID REP. 340 (2004). 
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confirmed that there is a “consistent jurisprudence of annulment 
committees” in treating Article 52(1)(e) as addressing “an absence 
instead of inadequacy or brevity of reasoning.”116  
If the tribunal’s reasons enable the committee to understand how 
the tribunal got from Point A to Point B, there is no failure to state 
reasons.117 That sounds reasonable, but it is subject to abuse, because 
almost any error of reasoning can, at bottom, be shown to contain an 
absence of reasoning and can at bottom not enable the reader to 
follow the tribunal from A to B. 
Again, the Enron decision is a case in point. As noted above, the 
ad hoc Committee annulled the Tribunal’s decision on the basis that 
it was not satisfied that Argentina’s actions were not “the only way 
for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and 
imminent peril”118 and hence, in the Committee’s opinion, the 
Tribunal had manifestly exceeded its powers. However, the 
Committee also went on to state: 
even if the Tribunal did in fact satisfy itself that the “only way” 
requirement in Article 25(1)(a) was not met on the evidence before it, it is 
not apparent from the reasoning in the Award how or why the Tribunal 
came to that legal conclusion. Even if, contrary to all appearance, the 
Tribunal did apply the “only way” requirement in Article 25(1)(a), the 
Committee considers that the Tribunal failed to state reasons for its 
decision. This constitutes a ground for annulment under Article 52(1)(e) 
of the ICSID Convention.119 
The ad hoc Committee reached this conclusion despite the fact 
that the Tribunal, composed of three experienced arbitrators, had 
devoted 55 paragraphs of the award to a discussion of the various 
aspects of the necessity defense, including the following statement: 
 
 116. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Rep. of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 
Decision on Annulment, ¶ 78 (Mar. 21, 2007), 13 ICSID REP. 500 (2008). This 
approach has not been followed by all ad hoc Committees. See, e.g., Mitchell v. 
Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID Case No. ATB/99/7, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 41 (Nov. 
1, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/mitchellannulment.pdf (annulling for “a 
failure to state reasons, in the sense that the inadequacy of reasons is such that it 
seriously affects the coherence of the reasoning . . . .”). 
 117. MINE, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Decision on Partial Annulment, ¶ 5.09 
(Dec. 22, 1989), 4 ICSID REP. 79 (1997). 
 118. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 349 (July 30, 
2010), http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf. 
 119. Id. ¶ 378. 
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It is thus quite evident that measures had to be adopted to offset the 
unfolding crisis. Whether the measures taken under the Emergency Law 
were the “only way” to achieve this result and no other alternative was 
available, is also a question on which the parties and their experts are 
profoundly divided, as noted above. A rather sad world comparative 
experience in the handling of economic crises, shows that there are 
always many approaches to address and correct such critical events, and it 
is difficult to justify that none of them were available in the Argentine 
case.  
While one or other party would like the Tribunal to point out which 
alternative was recommendable, it is not the task of the Tribunal to 
substitute for the governmental determination of economic choices, only 
to determine whether the choice made was the only way available, and 
this does not appear to be the case.120  
This constitutes the Tribunal’s reasoning on the question of 
whether Argentina satisfied the “only way” test. It may be brief and 
somewhat opaque, but to characterize it as non-existent is 
inappropriate.121 Indeed, just two paragraphs before concluding that 
“the Tribunal failed to state reasons for its decision,” the Committee 
had itself characterized the Tribunal’s reasoning as “cursory.”122 This 
is surely a more appropriate description. 
Ad hoc committees have also deviated from the “absence of 
reasons” standard by equating failure to state reasons with the 
provision of contradictory reasons. The supposed justification for 
this conflation is that two contradictory reasons negate one another 
and thus constitute non-existent reasons.123  
The potential for abuse is obvious. Arbitral awards running to 
several hundred pages will frequently contain minor contradictions in 
 
 120. Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 308–09 
(May 22, 2007). 
 121. See Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 378 (“Even if, contrary to all 
appearance, the Tribunal did apply the ‘only way’ requirement in Article 25(1)(a), 
the Committee considers that the Tribunal failed to state reasons for its decision.”). 
 122. Id. ¶ 376. 
 123. Klöckner, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 116 (Oct. 
21, 1983), 1 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 90, 125 (“As for 
‘contradiction of reasons,’ it is in principle appropriate to bring this notion under 
the category ‘failure to state reasons’ for the very simple reasons that two 
genuinely contradictory reasons cancel each other out. Hence the failure to state 
reasons.”). 
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their reasoning. There is also the risk that tribunals’ attempts to 
balance conflicting considerations may be mistaken for contradictory 
reasons.124 
Amco I again provides an example of overzealous review. The ad 
hoc Committee noted that, under Indonesian law, the amount of an 
investment was calculated by reference to “equity capital” and 
excluded any loans made to an investor.125 The Committee also noted 
that the Tribunal had been aware of this requirement but nevertheless 
had apparently included a loan of US$1,000,000 in its calculation of 
Amco’s investment without providing an explanation of why it had 
done so.126 The ad hoc Committee therefore held that the Tribunal 
had contradicted itself and thus annulled the Award for manifest 
excess of powers and failure to give reasons.127 
This level of scrutiny might be appropriate for an appellate body, 
but it is inappropriate for an ad hoc committee to scour an award for 
inconsistencies and then to annul on the basis that the Tribunal’s 
inconsistent reasoning amounts to a failure to give reasons.  
In a welcome development, the recent decision in Continental 
Casualty points towards less intensive review in relation to 
contradictory reasons. The ad hoc Committee stated: 
for genuinely contradictory reasons to cancel each other out, they must be 
such as to be incapable of standing together on any reasonable reading of 
the decision. An example might be where the basis for a tribunal’s 
decision on one question is the existence of fact A, when the basis for its 
decision on another question is the non-existence of fact A. In cases 
where it is merely arguable whether there is a contradiction or 
inconsistency in the tribunal’s reasoning, it is not for an annulment 
committee to resolve that argument. Nor is it the role of an annulment 
committee to express its own view on whether or not the reasons given by 
 
 124. See Vivendi I, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 65 
(July 3, 2002), 6 ICSID REP. 340, 358 (2004) (“It is frequently said that 
contradictory reasons cancel each other out, and indeed if reasons are genuinely 
contradictory so they might. However, tribunals must often struggle to balance 
conflicting considerations, and an ad hoc committee should be careful not to 
discern contradiction when what is actually expressed in a tribunal’s reasons could 
more truly be said to be but a reflection of such conflicting considerations.”). 
 125. Amco I, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 97 (May 
16, 1986), 1 ICSID REP. 509, 535 (1993). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. ¶¶ 97–98. 
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the tribunal are logical or rational or correct.128 
III.CONSEQUENCES AND SOLUTIONS 
A. CONSEQUENCES 
One can wonder whether excessive annulments matter, especially 
to States, who are the sole parties to the ICSID Convention. Even 
though the States did not, by their drafting, expose ICSID arbitration 
to appellate review, it is States, more often than investors, who 
benefit from excessive annulment decisions. There may, moreover, 
be at least one virtue in the annulment threat: ICSID arbitral tribunals 
are on notice to be careful and comprehensive and coherent in their 
awards.  
Exuberant annulments are, though, a problem for ICSID and for 
actual and prospective ICSID parties. States set up the ICSID system 
to assure foreign investors of an appropriate forum for investment 
disputes. To the extent that such forum becomes inappropriate in a 
way that contravenes the language of the Convention, the interests of 
States are disserved. Moreover, errors by ICSID arbitrators already 
are subject to a constraint: ICSID’s transparency, which causes an 
ICSID tribunal to know that its award will likely be subject to public 
scrutiny whether or not there is an annulment.  
The costs of excessive annulment include, quite apart from the 
millions of dollars in legal fees spent on annulment proceedings that 
violate the language and spirit of Article 52, (i) millions of dollars in 
compromised settlements agreed by parties out of fear of annulment 
proceedings, and (ii) valid ICSID claims forewent because the risk of 
a two-stage process tips the balance against bringing a claim. 
Investment treaty arbitration engages the public interest in a 
manner that commercial arbitration does not, and there is special 
reason to promote consistent jurisprudence in investment 
arbitration.129 In the absence of an appellate structure, ad hoc 
 
 128. Continental Casualty Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on 
Annulment, ¶ 103 (Sept. 16, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Front 
Servlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2291_En&caseI
d=C13. 
 129. See, e.g., Stephan W. Schill, Crafting the International Economic Order: 
The Public Function of Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Significance for the 
Role of the Arbitrator, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 401, 408–409 (2010) (explaining the 
  
2012] ABUSIVE ICSID ANNULMENTS 757 
committees may believe they have a role to play in promoting 
consistent jurisprudence, whether by annulling decisions they 
consider to be incorrect or criticizing the merits of decisions but 
leaving them intact. 
Neither of these two options is desirable. Excessive annulment 
would again lead the ICSID arbitration system to resemble “an 
elaborate and expensive game of snakes and ladders,”130 which is 
unattractive as a means of settling investment disputes. Even when ad 
hoc committees do not annul, they can do damage by excessive 
scrutiny of the merits. Several ad hoc committees in recent years have 
“proceeded to a microscopic dissection of the award; [they have 
identified] a number of problems with the award and [said] what the 
award should have done,” before concluding that the flaws were not 
sufficient for the committee to annul.131 One must wonder what effect 
such dicta have on a State’s willingness to pay a substantial award 
which has been torn apart but not annulled by an ad hoc committee. 
The excessive scrutiny in recent decisions threatens to undermine 
one of the attractions of ICSID arbitration. As recently as 2009, 
Professor Schreuer wrote: 
The self-contained and exhaustive nature of review procedures under the 
ICSID Convention . . . serves the interest of finality of awards and 
provides a clear advantage over other arbitration mechanisms. Awards 
stemming from arbitration systems such as the ICC, the AAA or 
UNCITRAL are subject to potentially protracted and costly review 
procedures by the courts of the arbitration forum.132 
In contrast, a 2010 survey of international experts133 on the choices 
 
role of investment treaty arbitration as facilitating investment, creating jobs, and 
“domesticating” remedies for actions of foreign investors, and the need, therefore, 
for consistent arbitral jurisprudence). 
 130. Redfern, supra note 11, at 99. 
 131. Gaëtan Verhoosel, Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards: 
To ICSID or Not to ICSID, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE 14 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 285, 306 
(A.J. van den Berg ed., 2009). 
 132. SCHREUER, supra note 29, at 1103. 
 133. See M. Burgstaller & C.B. Rosenberg, Challenging International Arbitral 
Awards: To ICSID or Not to ICSID?, 27 ARB. INT’L 91, 93 (2011) (“In August 
2010, we distributed the . . . questionnaire to 198 international arbitration experts 
based in England, France and the United States, as identified by the Global 
Arbitration Review’s ‘Who’s Who of Commercial Arbitration [2010].’”). Most 
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of forum in investment arbitration, received multiple responses to the 
effect that “ICSID annulment proceedings have become almost 
routine, are unpredictable, and go too far in the merits of the case.”134 
In the immediate aftermath of Sempra and Enron, the study’s findings 
were that “[o]nly a small minority of expert respondents favored 
ICSID procedures over domestic procedures: 16 per cent as compared 
to English law, and 10 per cent as compared to French or US law.”135  
Although a snapshot survey does not tell us much about user 
preferences, unless the recent trend towards a two-stage process is 
checked, investors will inevitably be deterred from bringing valid 
claims to ICSID arbitration. 
B. SOLUTIONS 
There is no easy solution to the problem of excessive annulments. 
Amending Article 52 is not plausible. Under Article 66 of the 
ICSID Convention, any proposed amendment to the Convention will 
become effective only once “all Contracting States have ratified, 
accepted or approved the amendment.”136 The prospects of achieving 
such unanimity are virtually nil. 
Changing the way that ad hoc committees are constituted is 
unlikely. Ad hoc committees are, under the Convention, comprised 
from a list designated by States,137 and as States are almost always 
the parties seeking annulment, the exuberance for annulment may 
partially be explained by the circumstances that lead to the 
appointment by ICSID of ad hoc Committee members. 
The question we are left with is: how best can we deliver ad hoc 
committees from the temptation to exceed their jurisdiction under 
Article 52?  
 
respondents “had a negative view of the ICSID annulment procedures.” Id. at 94. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. SCHREUER, supra note 29, at 1265. 
 137. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, arts. 13, 52. Pursuant to Article 52(3) 
of the ICSID Convention, ad hoc Committee members must be selected from the 
Panel of Arbitrators. The Panel of Arbitrators consists of persons designated by 
Member States pursuant to Article 13(1) of the ICSID Convention. In addition, 
under Article 13(2), the Chairman of the Administrative Council (i.e., the President 
of the World Bank) has the power to designate up to ten persons to the Panel of 
Arbitrators. 
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Looking back, we can observe that the first wave of rabid 
annulments subsided without ICSID taking any formal steps. One 
must wonder whether the Center acted to stop the first wave by 
conveying, by informal means, to certain ad hoc committee 
members, particularly the chairmen of such committees, that 
excessive annulments had to be curtailed and that the language and 
spirit of Article 52 had to be respected.138 It is notable that Professor 
Sompong Sucharitkul was appointed as President of the ad hoc 
committees in Klöckner II, Amco II, and MINE. Those decisions are 
credited with stopping the first wave of excessive annulments.139 
One option that has been proposed is the issuance of guidelines or 
an interpretive note by ICSID’s Administrative Council emphasizing 
the limited nature of review under Article 52 and exhorting ad hoc 
committees not to annul except in exceptional cases of serious 
procedural injustice.140 Following the Fraport annulment, the 
Philippines wrote to the Administrative Council suggesting that a 
special task force be established to make recommendations as to 
guidelines that could be issued by the Administrative Council to ad 
hoc committees.141 The idea is attractive because it would allow 
ICSID formally to exert pressure on ad hoc committees to respect 
their limited jurisdiction.142 The issuance of such guidelines would 
 
 138. See Reisman, Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 
supra note 11, at 207 (“It may be expected that use of the annulment procedure 
would be a rare event because of the seriousness of the shortcomings against which 
it is meant to be a safeguard. This still seems to be the case, since the annulment 
procedure has only been invoked in three disputes before the Center. However, if 
parties dissatisfied with awards regularly seek annulment such a practice may put 
in doubt the features which make ICSID arbitration an attractive means of settling 
investment disputes-namely its speed, comparatively low cost, and its 
effectiveness.”) (quoting IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY 
GENERAL: TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL AT ITS TWENTY SECOND ANNUAL 
MEETING 3 (1988)). These remarks were interpreted by Michael Reisman as “jaw-
boning,” intended to have an “impact on subsequent members of ad hoc 
committees who are effectively appointed by the Secretary General.” Id. at 208. 
 139. Christoph Schreuer, Three Generations of ICSID Annulment Proceedings, 
in ANNULMENT OF ICSID AWARDS 17–18 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, 
eds., 2004). 
 140. See Jason Clapham, Finality of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: Has the 
Tide Turned and Is There a Need for Reform?, 26 J. INT’L ARB. 437, 464 (2009) 
(recommending that the interpretive note confirm that an award should be annulled 
only for the most limited and fundamental errors). 
 141. Letter from the Office of the Solicitor General, supra note 114. 
 142. It has been suggested that the Administrative Council has the power to 
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likely have an impact, at least over the medium-term. Over the 
longer-term, however, guidelines are as vulnerable to misapplication 
as is the language of Article 52. 
Public criticism by members of the investment community has a 
sure impact. The criticism of Klöckner I and Amco I undoubtedly 
sensitized future ad hoc Committees to the undesirable consequences 
of substituting their own decisions on the merits for those of the 
Tribunal.143 History shows, however, that over twenty-five years the 
heightened sensitivity wore off.  
A new wave of criticism has arisen in the wake of the second 
wave of excessive annulments and the decisions in GDF and 
Continental Casualty suggest that a renewed cautious approach to 
annulment applications is already with us.144 On the assumption that 
the second wave has subsided, the challenge will be to break the 
cycle and avoid a third wave.  
Many ICSID parties (particularly Respondent States) will continue 
to invoke their remedies under Article 52.145 If there is consistent 
commentary and renewed jurisprudence to the effect that annulment 
is to be granted only in exceptional circumstances of serious 
procedural injustice and if cost awards are made against parties 
submitting obviously unmeritorious applications, the number of 
unmeritorious annulment applications should diminish and the third 
wave, should it ever come, will be put off that much longer. 
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other functions as it shall determine to be necessary for the implementation of the 
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ICSID award and to show how readily such an award may be set aside, within the 
ICSID system itself.”). 
 144. See generally, e.g., Crivellaro, supra note 59 (discussing the trend of ad 
hoc committees reverting back to the more interventionist approach to annulment 
decisions of the “first-generation” of such claims); Schreuer, From ICSID 
Annulment to Appeal, supra note 43 (criticizing the recent, expansive annulment 
approaches taken by many ad hoc committees). 
 145. Broches, supra note 34, at 376 (predicting this result). 
